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Responsibility To Protect: 
An Argentine Perspective
Ricardo Arredondo
Introduction
The question of humanitarian intervention was a central theme of 
the international agenda between the end of the Cold War, and up 
until the events of September 11, 2001. After the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(“UNSG”) at the time posed an interrogation to the UN: How should 
the international community react when human rights violations 
occur within a State, bearing in mind the traditional principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs?1
Events such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, 
and Kosovo, among others, exemplify the lack of response from the 
international community to these mass atrocities. The rejection of 
humanitarian intervention by a large number of States evidenced the 
need to start looking for a different answer to these types of situations.
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 More than a decade after the emergence of the Responsibility to 
Protect (“RtoP”) principle2 and ten years after its endorsement3 by the 
international community, recent events have once again emphasized 
both the importance and challenges of ensuring timely and decisive 
responses to the four core crimes covered by the principle.4 These events 
have stressed the need to further operationalize the principle in order to 
implement it effectively and prevent mass atrocities (Arredondo, 2009).
Recent events related to specific crises such as those in Sri Lanka 
and Cote d’Ivoire, the intervention in Libya, the ongoing conflicts 
in Syria and the Central African Republic (“CAR”), among others, 
demonstrate the persistent challenges involved in reaching a 
common understanding on how to ensure the timely and effective 
implementation of the RtoP principle. At the same time, it is 
difficult to generate a common political will and an effective capacity 
to prevent or stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity, whether committed by national and local 
authorities or non State actors. These discussions are not absent in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, as this special issue of Pensamiento 
Propio shows. As a matter of fact, this region has taken lead on the 
RtoP debate by bringing about its own experiences and perspectives 
that shape a unique reading of the international community and its 
responsibilities when dealing with the State’s inability to protect its 
own people and prevent mass atrocities.
In light of such difficult questions, this article analyzes Argentina’s 
past and present stance on the RtoP principle. However, any discussion 
on this matter should start by briefly considering what we are talking 
about when we say “responsibility to protect” Arredondo 2012a), what 
this principle encompasses, and finally the current situation regarding 
the historical and political context which has determined the stance 
taken by Argentina when implementing its foreign policy decisions.
Foreign Interventionism Or Protection Of Human 
Rights?
The dilemma was-and remains-between the sovereign right of a 
nation to be free from outside interference and the right of other 
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states to defend and protect human dignity on a universal basis.5 This 
tension has been greatly exacerbated by the globalization process 
(Hardt and Negri, 1992).
 This is a time when the globalization of markets and finance, not 
to mention other challenges such as climate change, piracy, and 
terrorism, test the strength and authority of the State. This notion 
of sovereignty, which is the traditional base of international politics,6 
is going through a prolonged crisis of identity and purpose (Brotóns, 
2001: 137-138). Furthermore, the growing global media coverage 
of mass atrocities and the increasing involvement of civil society (a 
phenomenon that some authors call “empathy without borders”) 
(Fiott, 2012) are also playing an important role. All of these factors 
have led to discussions about foreign intervention that are even more 
acute and controversial than in the past.
Faced with this dilemma, following a Canadian-Australian initiative, 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(“ICISS”) was established, and by the end of 2001 it issued a report 
titled “The Responsibility to Protect”.7 The ICISS report sought 
to find a way out of the paradox posed by the Secretary-General, 
which proposed to introduce a fundamental change in perspective 
by considering the issue in terms of “responsibility to protect” 
rather than “humanitarian intervention”.8 The report concludes that 
sovereignty not only gives the state the right to “control” their affairs, 
but also confers upon it the primary “responsibility” to protect the 
population within its borders.9 Likewise, the report states that when 
a State fails to protect its people, due to lack of ability or willingness, 
the international community should take on that responsibility.10 The 
RtoP principle has been further defined to encompass three different 
dimensions: (1) the responsibility to prevent; (2) the responsibility to 
react; and (3) the responsibility to rebuild.11
The RtoP concept was subsequently incorporated in a series of UN 
documents (although non-binding from a legal standpoint). In its 
report, A More Secure World: A Shared Responsibility: Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the UN echoed 
the ICISS Report and stressed that more than a right to intervene, 
the States have an obligation erga omnes to take all measures in 
their power to prevent or put an end to serious and massive human 
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rights violations as soon as possible.12 The report argues that it is a 
collective international responsibility, “exercisable by the Security 
Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the 
event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and 
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign 
governments had proved powerless or unwilling to prevent”. 
The Panel stated that in  order to legitimize the use of force by 
the Security Council of the UN, certain basic criteria should be 
considered, such as the seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, 
last resort, and proportionality of the response.13 As Focarelli 
noted, it is almost commonplace to observe that the conditions 
or precautionary principles developed by the ICISS and collected 
in the UN Report14 faithfully reflect those made by the Christian 
theological tradition of just war, although he acknowledges that 
the problem is not the guidelines themselves but how they are 
interpreted in each particular case (Focarelli, 2008: 191; 191-193; 
196).
In its 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All, the Secretary-General of the UN affirmed 
that the international community “must also move towards 
embracing and acting on the ‘responsibility to protect’ potential or 
actual victims of massive atrocities”.15 In this regard, he proposed 
that in order to authorize the use of force, a set of criteria must be 
fulfilled such as “the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose 
of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of 
force might reasonably succeed in stopping the threat, whether the 
military option is proportional to the threat at hand and whether 
there is a reasonable chance of success”.16
The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome provides, for the first time, 
a common definition of the principle of RtoP.17 The principle of 
RtoP, embedded in paragraphs 138 and 139, represents an important 
step forward by establishing the obligation of states to protect their 
populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity. Similarly, it embodies the obligation of the 
international community to help States assume this responsibility 
and to react should they fail to protect their citizens against these 
four specified crimes and violations.18
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Since its first report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in 
200919, the UNSG issued reports on an annual basis to try to clarify 
different aspects of the RtoP principle and foster the debate among 
Member States. In 2010, the Secretary-General addressed an informal 
interactive General Assembly dialogue on Early Warning, Assessment 
and the Responsibility to Protect,20 and the following year on The 
Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect.21 On September 5, 2012, the Secretary-
General presented his report on The Responsibility to Protect: Timely 
and Decisive Response,22 in 2013 he published his fifth report, 
State Responsibility and Prevention,23 and on 12 August 2014, the 
Secretary-General released his sixth report Fulfilling our Collective 
Responsibility: International Assistance and the Responsibility to 
Protect, on the Second Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect.24
As the Secretary-General explained, the principle of RtoP is based on 
three pillars, namely: (1) the State bears the primary responsibility 
to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing; (2) the international community 
must assist States in fulfilling their protection obligations; and (3) 
when a State manifestly fails to protect its population or is in fact 
a perpetrator of these crimes, the international community has a 
responsibility to take collective action.25
The RtoP principle has undergone criticism that it is humanitarian 
intervention under a different name (Marks and Cooper, 2010: 91-
93). In particular, it has been said that it gives powerful countries 
a window of opportunity to use force under their own discretion, 
emphasizing mainly the “responsibility to react” dimension.26 In this 
regard, it must be recalled that RtoP encompasses three different 
dimensions which involve using all available tools under Chapters 
VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter, ranging from non-coercive responses 
to collective action.27 This is a fundamental reflection towards the 
further development and the legitimacy of the principle.
The development of the RtoP principle is welcome since it clarifies 
and strengthens the existing obligations of states to ensure the 
protection of civilians.28 In this regard, it represents an important step 
towards anticipating, preventing, and responding to genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, 
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it upholds fundamental principles of international law, in particular 
international humanitarian, refugee, and human rights law. The 
principles should be applied as consistently and uniformly as possible, 
to which effect it is crucially important that early warning and 
assessment should be conducted fairly, prudently, and professionally 
and that the use of force should remain the measure of last resort. As 
the European Union put it, the principle has been considered to be 
“critical for the survival of the community of nations”.29
The development of the RtoP principle, particularly its prevention 
component, can advance global efforts towards a more peaceful 
world. This is bearing in mind that many mass atrocity crimes occur 
during periods of violent conflict, and these situations evidence the 
necessity to create effective capacities for structural and operational 
conflict prevention.30 Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to 
minimize the need to recourse to the use of force, leaving it as the 
last resort.
Argentina, Human Rights, And Interventionism
Before considering its present stance regarding the RtoP principle, 
it is important to bear in mind Argentina’s history and its strong 
support of non-intervention (Brotóns, 2007: 138; Yepes, 1935: 55).  
In addition, it is also relevant to analyze the well-built Argentine 
tradition regarding human rights (Pinto, 2007). In my view, the 
combination of these elements is essential to understanding the 
current foreign policy positions of the States of the region vis-á-vis 
the RtoP principle.
Additionally, it is also important to note that while many observers 
are accustomed to think of Latin America as a monolithic subject, 
the region shows a healthy political and ideological diversity that is 
reflected in the foreign policy positions taken by their governments 
which do not necessarily agree with positions held by these countries 
in the past (Oelsner, 2005).
The new political and ideological diversity “affects certain regional 
alliances to the extent that hemispheric geopolitical tensions translate 
Ricardo Arredondo
73
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
into ‘ideological frontiers’” when addressing issues that take up the 
foreign policy agenda of our countries (Arredondo, 2011).  At the 
same time, there seems to be two muscular elements of continuity in 
the Latin American agenda: human rights and the principle of non-
interventionin internal affairs.31
Latin American foreign policy was built gradually during the 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century based on six principles: 
(1) sovereign equality of all States; (2) no intervention; (3) 
territorial integrity; (4) self-determination; (5) peaceful settlement 
of disputes; and (6) respect for international law (Petrella, 2013). 
Successive Inter-American Conferences from 1899 strengthened 
these principles, rejected interventionism, and set up exemplary 
humanitarian practices such as asylum and convinced the United 
States to inaugurate the policy of the “good neighbor”, which led to 
greater cooperation and understanding within the hemisphere.
After World War II, the adoption of the Charter of the Organization 
of American States (“OAS”),32 along with the American Treaty on 
Pacific Settlement, also known as the “Pact of Bogota”33, and the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,34 contributed 
to reinforcing these principles within the region. Indeed, it must be 
reminded that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man preceded the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and many of the principles of the Inter-American system were 
incorporated into the Charter of the UN.35 From these historic 
moments, the role of the OAS, with its lights and shadows, has served 
to demonstrate that countries are associated mainly for two reasons: 
strategic needs arising from sharing a massive geographical area, and 
the cultural and institutional affinities reflected in common values 
such as democracy, human rights, and republican principles (Lagorio, 
1998: 121).
The Latin American and the Caribbean region is one with a long 
history of human rights violations, foreign interventionism, and 
political instability (Halperin Donghi, 1993). The past decade 
brought about a change with the implementation of democracy, 
the development of institutions, and the building of a unique Inter-
American human rights protection system (Goldman, 2009: 856-57).
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This system fosters a regional-level mechanism that contributes to 
preventing mass atrocities and reinforcing the responsibility of States 
in protecting its own people (Abramovich, 2009:11-12).
It represents an effort to overcome past failures and sets an example 
for the international community because it establishes preventive 
mechanisms to protect citizens and civilian populations36.
However, when the odds of protecting human rights in other States 
arises, Argentina shows strong support for the principle of non-
intervention in internal affairs and a clear reluctance to support 
any kind of foreign intervention (Bemis, 1943: 237). This is mainly 
due to historical reasons evidencing that interventionism has been 
used as an instrument of foreign policy in Latin America, mainly 
by the United States. But there are also many other examples of 
foreign interventions by hegemonic powers of each historical period 
(Caminos, 1998:196-197). In this regard, it is worth recalling the 
words of Argentine jurist Podestá Costa:
Facts show that interventionism has been due to several 
reasons: it has been founded on the desire to maintain 
political balance but also to cover it up several arguments 
were alleged from humanitarian reasons to racial or 
religious persecution ... in any case, what is essential is that 
interventionism has been left to the unilateral and ultimate 
government action, that decided whether or not to use it, as 
it considered appropriate in each case regarding its particular 
interest and the political circumstances of place and time. 
Intervention is not a tool to be used by weaker States against 
the strong. It is a weapon that can only wield the powerful 
in certain cases when accidental circumstances so warrant 
.... Therefore, there is no right of intervention” (Arredondo, 
2012a: 252).
Perhaps it is unnecessary to underline that Podestá Costa’s words are 
as relevant today as when they were written more than fifty years ago. 
They also serve to explain why the principle of non-intervention has 
become a cornerstone of the Argentine foreign policy. As Caminos 
reminds  us, the rules on non-intervention in the OAS Charter are 
stricter than those of the UN Charter, for they not only prohibit 
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the use of armed force, but also all other forms of interference or 
attempted threat against the personality of the State in its political, 
economic, and cultural elements (Caminos, 1995: 963; 976).
Similar to the UN Charter, the OAS Charter contains numerous rules 
on the promotion and protection of human rights. These include the 
principle laid down in Article 3(e) that reads:
“Every State has the right to choose, without external 
interference, its political, economic, and social system and to 
organize itself in the way best suited to it, and has the duty 
to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State. 
Subject to the foregoing, the American States shall cooperate 
fully among themselves, independently of the nature of their 
political, economic, and social systems”.37
However, in light of the provisions of the OAS Charter, the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, and the practice of the Organization, it can be argued 
that human rights are no longer subject to the exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of Member States of the OAS. However, the ability of 
the OAS and other organizations in Latin America to adopt measures 
for the protection of human rights and international humanitarian 
law depends on the applicability of the instruments referred to in a 
particular casea nd on the political will of Member States to adopt 
concrete measures to this aim (Caminos, 1995: 977). Still, it is worth 
noting that in Latin America, a unilateral humanitarian intervention 
carried out by any Member State would be considered a violation of 
the principle of non-intervention.
Today, Argentina, like many other Latin American and Caribbean 
States, continue to consider the principle of non-intervention as 
the cornerstone on which the framework of international relations 
is based and therefore sustain that the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations 
and OAS.
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The Argentine Perspective On The Responsibility To 
Protect?
Latin American countries today show a divergent stance toward many 
issues affecting both the regional and the international agenda. In the 
case of RtoP, it is generally possible to draw three types of ideological 
boundaries that I call the Bolivarian, the Inter-American, and eclectic 
positions (Arredondo, 2011:11). The Bolivarian and Inter-American 
have clearly defined attitudes, while the eclectic borrows elements 
from the first two. The Bolivarian frontier or ALBA, which includes 
Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, depart from 
what can be called an “anti-imperialist” stance that situates Latin 
America in an opposite position to the United States. Therefore, 
it seeks to strengthen the non-intervention principle, rejecting all 
forms of foreign interference. Therefore, the responsibility to protect 
is perceived as a covert instrument of the hegemon that intends to 
intervene to protector enforce its own interests in the region (Toro 
Carnevali, 2012: 135; 151-153).
The Inter-American frontier is one that brings together most of the 
States of the region (Uruguay, El Salvador, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, among others). These countries, while holding dear the principle 
of non-intervention, consider the RtoP principle is a positive tool for 
the protection of human rights in humanitarian crises and therefore 
support the consolidation of the principle.
Finally, the eclectic frontier gathers countries like Brazil and Argentina 
which maintain a clear assertion for the promotion and protection 
of human rights, however do not seem to fully support the RtoP 
principle.38 Rhetorically they seem to support the RtoP principle, 
but they have also expressed some doubts on this issue. Brazil and 
Argentina maintain that RtoP needs further elaboration, particularly 
regarding the responsibility to react and the eventual use of force 
(Sainz-Borgo, 2012: 193).
In the case of Argentina, its support for the principles of national 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States 
is persistent in its discourse, yet Argentina is also considered an 
“RtoPChampion”. As Kikoler points out:
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“Argentina was part of a core group of states pushing for 
the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) at 
the 2005 UN World Summit. With the country’s history of 
mass atrocities and keen understanding of Latin America’s 
difficult history of external interference, they helped engage 
skeptical countries and persuaded them to support RtoP. 
While Argentina does not always invoke the language of RtoP, 
their actions in practice appear to reflect a commitment to 
its values” (Kikoler, 2015).
With respect to the three pillars established in this first Report of the 
UNSG, Argentina believes that the first pillar, which provides that 
each State has the responsibility to protect its own population, is not 
a problem. The same is true with regard to the second pillar regarding 
capacity building and assistance,39 in particular Argentina has been 
proactive when it comes to the issue of prevention.40 The third pillar, 
which upholds the necessity of a “timely and decisive response,” is 
clearly the most controversial one as it opens the possibility of the 
use of force within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
In this regard, it should be noted that there remains some sensitivity 
to the potential risks of abuse arising from the application of the 
concept in practice, which proved truthful after NATO’s actions in 
Libya in 2011.41
Historically, Argentina has expressed its willingness to contribute to 
the search for answers to humanitarian crises, as the international 
community has witnessed in the last decades.42  In this regard, 
Argentina expressed a clear preference for the utilization of collective 
security mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter, and its reluctance 
to accept that RtoP is exercised unilaterally by a State, a coalition 
of States, or regional organization without the authorization of the 
Security Council  (Arredondo, 2012c: 109; 129-130). Also, Argentina 
has affirmed that the UNSC has the legal framework and tools to 
implement the responsibility to react to cases where grave, massive, 
and systematic violations to human rights and humanitarian law 
occur.43 This requires the will of the Member States, and in particular, 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) to exercise 
this subsidiary responsibility effectively and legitimately (Arredondo, 
2012c: 130).  
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This position was foreshadowed in 2000, after a presentation by the 
UNSG on the “dilemma of intervention”.  At that time,  Argentina 
stated that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
a State should balance itself with the principle of non-indifference 
to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law”.44
Following this logic, Argentina shared the opinion that the weight of 
RtoP falls on the Security Council, and warned about the negative 
consequences that would result if an intervention was carried out 
by a coalition or organization of States or without authorization.45 
Notwithstanding that, Argentina believed that, if possible and when 
necessary, Member States should be able to initiate proceedings 
before regional agencies, according to the conditions of Article 53 
of the UN Charter, maintaining that they keep the UNSC fully 
informed (Arredondo, 2012a:281). Moreover, Argentina holds that 
the Security Council, through several of its resolutions, has created 
a legal framework that has substantially improved the international 
regime for the protection of peoples.46 At the same time, Argentina 
considers that the Council has received a mandate from the UNGA 
which urges measures of “collective action in a timely and decisive 
manner to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, the ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity”.47
The positions mentioned above were reiterated by Argentina at the 
sixth Thematic Dialogues on the Responsibility to Protect, which 
took place between 2009 and 2014 at the General Assembly. Each of 
these Thematic Dialogues were preceded by a report of the UNSG 
that helped focus the debate on a certain aspect of the principle. A 
close look at the statements made by the representatives of Argentina 
shows that there was little to no modifications on the positions 
adopted by this country.
Following the Report of the Secretary-General from July 23, 2009, 
the Argentine government decided to join the group of likeminded 
countries to work together in promoting and strengthening the 
principle, bearing in mind the close relationship between human 
rights, peace and international security (Arredondo, 2012a:281-286). 
This decision is part of a policy to promote, protect, and respect human 
rights and international humanitarian law, a policy that Argentina 
has sustained since its return to democracy in 1983. During the past 
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thirty-years, Argentina has shown its concern and commitment to 
this area, which has earned it a prominent place in the defense of 
international humanitarian causes, along with active participation in 
causes related to prevention, cessation, and mediation in situations 
where gross and systematic human rights violations and international 
humanitarian law take place.
On this occasion, Argentina reiterated its support for the RtoP 
principle48 on the grounds that a State has the primary responsibility 
to protect its population and that the international community has a 
subsidiary responsibility, which should be carried out through the UN 
in a timely and decisive manner. In this regard, Argentina expressed 
hat experience has shown that the UNSC has determined, in various 
occasions, that massive and systematic violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law are a threat to peace and international 
security.  From this, Argentina concluded that the current UN legal 
framework provides for an opportunity to react and to decisively end 
these types of situations if the UNSC has the political will to do so. 
Nevertheless, Argentina was reluctant to define criteria in order to 
guide the process of decision-making by the Security Council. On 
the one hand, Argentina felt that adopting criteria could lead to a 
procedural debate that could affect the decision-making process. 
However, in case of an eventual paralysis of the Council, some 
countries might be tempted to act unilaterally by using those criteria 
of legitimacy to act outside the system.
Considering that many States have expressed deep reservations about 
RtoP, linking the principle to humanitarian intervention, Argentina 
believed it would be useful to make efforts aimed at promoting the 
principle in developing countries, in particular, those that could 
potentially take place in areas with risky human rights situations. 
This position is based on the understanding that implementing RtoP 
is necessary to advance a common strategy model that will have the 
consensus of the wider UN membership.
When the UNSG report titled Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect was debated at the UN General Assembly 
in2010, again Argentina showed a favorable attitude towards RtoP. 
On that occasion, the representative of Argentina said that RtoP is 
an essential obligation of States since it combines all international 
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obligations to protect the human person. However, when States 
fail to satisfy their obligations, the UN cannot remain inactive and 
must take action to prevent the commission of grave crimes. The 
implementation of RtoP requires careful and detailed discussion, 
and the General Assembly is the appropriate forum for this debate. 
Argentina is convinced that, as stated in paragraph 139 of the Outcome 
Document, the UNGA should continue to examine the issue, in order 
to implement RtoP. Argentina considered that “the ‘duty to protect’ 
... is nothing but the synthesis of other international obligations 
and reiterated the importance of prevention efforts and assistance, 
particularly in the case of those States that lack the infrastructure 
required to apply these types of international cooperation programs”. 
With respect to the third pillar, referring to the timely and decisive 
response, Argentina considered the adoption of measures by the 
UN system in implementing RtoP to be very useful in protecting 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity (Pace, 2012: 13-14). However, Argentina 
felt hesitant to accept assumptions that unilateral actions could 
constitute a collective armed action, and argued that the collective 
security system must be activated using the mechanisms provided 
for in the UN Charter. At that time, Argentina’s position emphasized 
three essential aspects: (1) the need to respect human rights; (2) the 
importance of early warning and assessment; and (3) the continued 
international commitment, through the General Assembly, on the 
subject. Argentina noted that political dialogue between Members 
should continue specifically on how to implement the strategy and 
stated that the UN action must be complemented by regional or sub-
regional efforts.
When the situation in Libya arose in early 2011, Argentina expressed 
“its deep concern over the grave situation” while regretting “the loss 
of life and violence occurring in the fighting”.49 It urged for “a quick 
and peaceful settlement, within a constructive democratic dialogue 
that grants full respect for human rights and the will of the Libyan 
people”.50 Further, Argentina was deeply concerned about the serious 
human rights violations in Libya, and co-sponsored a special session of 
the Human Rights Council, called for by the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Navi Pillay. Mr. Pillay requested an immediate 
end to the grave human rights violations committed by the Libyan 
Ricardo Arredondo
81
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
authorities, and the launch of an international investigation into 
the violent repression of demonstrations in that country.51  However, 
Argentina expressly rejected the inclusion of the proposed measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which it conditioned to a 
corroboration of the situation by objective, serious, and concluding 
data (Tettamanti, 2012).
These conditions were intended to prevent the kind of action that was 
later triggered by the authorization granted by UNSC Resolutions 
1970 and 1973, for which there is heavy criticism. These Resolutions 
represented the first instance in which a case of RtoP led to a military 
intervention. The adoption of Resolution 1973 had the support 
of the Arab League and the African Union, which conferred upon 
them unquestioned legitimacy from the beginning,52 although two 
permanent Members (China and Russia) and three other Members 
(Brazil, Germany and India) abstained. The resolution established a 
no-fly zone and a naval embargo on Libya and “authorized Member 
States to take “all necessary measures ... to protect civilians, excluding 
a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory”.53
In July 2011, a meeting organized by the Government of Mexico 
for the former Special Advisor on RtoP, Edward Luck, and the Latin 
American “friends of RtoP,” was held to discuss the third report by 
the Secretary-General on the matter.54 During this meeting, the 
Argentine delegate supported Luck’s view that in implementing 
RtoP, the cultural and institutional differences of each region must 
be taken into account and respected (Arredondo, 2012c: 125). In this 
regard, she recalled the development of RtoP in Latin America, where 
situations of massive and systematic human rights violations took 
place before the emergence of RtoP. Similarly, she highlighted the 
fact that Latin America has assigned significant value to the principle 
of non-intervention. Many delegations, including Argentina, agreed 
that the RtoP principle does not imply the emergence of a new rule, 
but rather summarizes existing obligations regarding the obligation of 
the State to protect its population in light of universal standards and 
regional protection of human rights and international humanitarian 
law mechanisms. Therefore, it confirmed the importance of second 
and third pillar, and reaffirmed the notion that the third pillar must 
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be considered a last resort in cases of grave and massive violations 
of human rights which can be categorized as one of the four crimes. 
There was also widespread agreement and concern to avoid selectivity 
and “regime change” as veiled objectives of powerful countries. 
Likewise, the important role of regional agencies in implementing 
RtoP obligations was addressed, considering the specific mechanisms 
adopted in the OAS framework as well as other sub-regional 
organizations. In this regard, the “democratic clause” adopted at OAS, 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Union of South American 
Nations (Unasur), etc., was recalled. Similarly, the precursor role 
of the Inter-American system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights and the fight against impunity was also mentioned. 
While regional initiatives may not have developed solutions for the 
fight against impunity in cases of massive and systematic violations 
of human rights, the lessons learned from these experiences could be 
the basis for regional capacity building.
On February 21, 2012, an informal meeting organized by the 
Permanent Mission of Brazil, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and the UN Special Adviser for RtoP, was held on the concept of 
“Responsibility while Protecting” (RWP) to address the components 
of the concept paper submitted by Brazil. The meeting was followed 
by a lively debate and was marked with high participation by Member 
States. Argentina expressed its support for the Brazilian initiative, 
stressing that it represents a “substantive” contribution and 
“overcomes” the RtoP principle.55 Argentina stated that this proposal 
“rightly captures our own vision” and “represents an opportunity 
to progressively develop a substantive aspect of RtoP” (Arredondo, 
2012c:127). It further added that it is imperative to strengthen 
protection strategies on the ground with clear and predictable rules, 
since it is unacceptable that the very protection the international 
community intends to provide could result in further damage to the 
same innocent civilians they seek to protect. Taking into consideration 
that the Security Council’s actions are based on a case-by-case basis, 
Argentina highlighted the need to establish clear rules that respond 
to the essential objective of protection, and consequently prevent 
the concept from being manipulated and misrepresented in order to 
implement regime change.
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One of the corollaries of the armed intervention in Libya was there 
luctance of many Latin American countries, including Argentina, 
to support any kind of use of force in Syria.56 As the Argentine 
representative put it:
“The concerns risen (sic) by the coercive action in Libya 
include resorting to the use of force without trying other 
measures first, regime change, the adequacy of air strikes to 
protect civilians, the need for the Security Council to do a 
follow up of the authorized measures and accountability of 
those authorized use of armed force. Those reservations must 
be addressed in order to ensure that action by the United 
Nations does not cause more victims than civilians protected, 
that it does not incur in legitimizing political objectives 
beyond those of the Organization and, in the end, to ensure 
the legitimacy of collective action by the United Nations”.57
Conclusions
There is no consensus in Latin America and the Caribbean on the 
principle of RtoP, but instead, there are three main trends amongst the 
countries in the region and their approach to this principle. On one 
hand there is a group of countries that promote a strong opposition 
against the concept. This group is represented by Venezuela, Cuba, 
and other ALBA member countries, whose criticism of the principle 
is based on the prevalence of state sovereignty and the principle of 
nonintervention. The second group of countries is characterized by a 
steady support for RtoP, and represented by Mexico, Panama, Chile, 
Costa Rica, and Guatemala amongst others. A third group, including 
Argentina and Brazil, two countries with a very strong human rights 
discourse, have a long history of support for UN lead missions and 
an active role in the development of RtoP, although from different 
perspectives.
In the case of Argentina, its support for the respect of state sovereignty 
and the principle of non-intervention is persistent in its discourse, yet 
it is also considered an “RtoP Champion”, bearing in mind that it has 
taken an active role in promoting the principle since its inception.58
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Within this framework, two contending juridical traditions struggle 
to impose their own principles to foreign policies of Latin American 
Governments: (1) the tradition of unrestricted respect for state 
sovereignty and the defense of the principle of non-intervention; and 
(2) a strong tradition of promotion and protection of human rights, 
particularly relevant after the demise of military dictatorships in the 
eighties.
An analysis of the Argentine position shows that while it has accepted 
the principle of RtoP, it is still reluctant to legalize the unilateral use 
of armed force on humanitarian excuses, especially in light of the 
abuses that have taken place in the past. In that sense, Argentina, like 
most States, do not feel inclined to open the norm under Article 2.4 
of the UN Charter in order to include an exception for humanitarian 
intervention (Schachter, 1984: 1620; 1624). As Goodman clearly 
explains “The overriding concern about pretext wars turns on 
assumptions about state opportunism and the power of both law and 
perceived legitimacy in regulating state behavior” (Goodman, 2006: 
107; 109).
The regional roundtables convened by the ICISS, as well as the 
subsequent consultations on the Report with NGOs and Governments 
coordinated by Canada and other civil society organizations, served to 
evidence that in most cases there was a widespread hostility towards 
the notion of humanitarian intervention, and a broad consensus 
against the idea of an alleged “right of intervention”, particularly 
when that alleged right was associated with unilateralism (World 
Federalist Movement-Institute of Global Policy, 2003; Morada, 2006: 
59-60).
But this deep skepticism towards intervention did not necessarily 
translate into a rejection of the underlying purpose of RtoP-the 
prevention of genocide and mass atrocities and the protection of 
vulnerable populations.59 The adoption of a text, which focused on 
the rights of endangered populations rather than the alleged right of 
intervention, contributed to a wide range of State and civil society 
actors who expressed a disposition to recognize that sovereignty 
entails responsibilities and that an international intervention can 
be legitimate in certain circumstances. However, the Commission’s 
approach to unilateral intervention and apparent openness to actions 
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authorized by the Security Council revealed that it was unlikely that 
the RtoP principle would be accepted without a careful examination 
(Arredondo, 2012a: 41).
The military intervention of 2011 in Libya shows the need to clarify 
the role of regional and sub-regional organizations when applying 
RtoP. Although such organizations can be both legitimizers and 
operational agents for the implementation of RtoP, they often lack 
capacities and resources to carry out operations in a meaningful way.
The three mentioned trends and established traditions raise a series 
of questions on the validity of the RtoP principle in this region. First, 
the usefulness of RtoP in Latin America and the Caribbean, taking 
into account the existence of a preventive system such as the Inter-
American Human Rights System, even if it is applicable ex post facto. 
Second, the different positions that it entails for the foreign policies 
of the LAC countries, particularly within a very dynamic process of 
regionalism and regional transformation, and the prevalence of the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Third, the 
involvement of several Latin American countries in peace operations 
and both the impact and influence of the LAC experience and 
debate on the issue of humanitarian intervention for the global 
agenda. Finally, the role of civil society organizations and networks in 
prevention in a region where democratic systems prevail.
As the representative of Argentina before the UNSC stated, “It is 
crucial that we put into practice regional and universal early-warning 
mechanisms to prevent atrocities, an aspect in which regional and 
national scope becomes essential to cooperation and dialogue in 
order for the rule of law to be strengthened”.60
Argentina has expressed its willingness to contribute to the search for 
answers to the humanitarian crises, and expressed a clear preference 
for the use of collective security mechanisms provided in the Charter 
of the United Nations. It has also expressed a reluctance to accept 
the RtoP principle to be exercised unilaterally either by a State, a 
coalition of States, or a regional body without express authorization 
of the UNSC. Moreover, Argentina has stated that the UNSC already 
has the legal framework and tools to implement that responsibility to 
react to serious, massive and systematic violations of human rights 
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and humanitarian law violations. The will of the UN Security Council 
Member States, and in particular, the P5, is a required condition to 
effectively and legitimately exercise that vicarious liability imposed 
on the international community as a whole.
As the Permanent Representative of the United States of America 
to the UN eloquently stated, “The international consensus around 
RtoP remains a signal achievement of multilateral cooperation and 
a testament to our common humanity”.61 It seems that Argentina 
and Latin America will continue to support and foster RtoP. However, 
this drive will heavily rely upon how the international community, 
and particularly its most powerful members, use this principle in the 
future.
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